1) UCC § 3-402. SIGNATURE BY REPRESENTATIVE:
(a) If a person acting, or purporting to act, as a representative
signs an instrument by signing either the name of the represented person
or the name of the signer, the represented person is bound by the
signature to the same extent the represented person would be bound if
the signature were on a simple contract. If the represented person is
bound, the signature of the representative is the "authorized signature
of the represented person" and the represented person is liable on the
instrument, whether or not identified in the instrument.
(b) If a representative signs the name of the representative to an instrument and the signature is an authorized signature of the represented person, the following rules apply: (1) If the form of the signature shows unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the represented person who is identified in the instrument, the representative is not liable on the instrument. [verified]
2) Republican government. One in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are specially delegated. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed. 219; Minor v. Happersett, 21 wall. 175,22 L. Ed. 627" Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition 1968, p.824.
3) see 16 Am Jur 2nd (pg 449,1998ed.) § 74 Construction with reference to Common Law> “An important canon of construction is that constitutions must, or at least may, be construed with reference to the common law, although the reverse is not necessarily true, since in most respects, the federal and state constitutions did not repudiate, but cherished, the established common law.”[verified]
4) JURISDICTION: It is the power conferred by the Constitution or by law, Corby v. Dooley, 313 Ill. App. 509, 40 N.E.2nd 581, 584 [Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition 1968 pg.991]
5) AMENDMENT XIV Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868 [no proof here]. Section 1.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
6) CONTRACT: An agreement between two or more parties, preliminary step in making of which is offer by one and acceptance by other, in which minds of parties meet and concur in understanding of terms. Lee v. Travellers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 173 S.C. 185, 175 S.E. 429
It is an agreement creating obligation, in which there must be competent parties, subject-matter, legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation, and agreement must not be so vague or uncertain that terms are not ascertainable. H.Liebes & Co. V. Klengenberg, C. C.A. Cal., 23 F.2nd 611, 612 [Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition -1968, pg394]
7) PERSON: Term may include artificial beings, as corporations, 1. Bla.Com. 123; 4 Bingh. 669; People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N.Y. 242,+ more [Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition -1968 pg.1299]
8) “The issue before us today is of precisely that sort. As we have recently had occasion to explain, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of "unreasonable seizures," insofar as it applies to seizure of the person, preserves for our citizens the traditional protections against unlawful arrest afforded by the common law. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. [500 U.S. 61] 621 (1991). ...one of the most important of those -- was that a person arresting a suspect without a warrant must deliver the arrestee to a magistrate "as soon as he reasonably can." 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 95, n. 13 (1st Am. ed. 1847). See also: 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *289, *293; Wright v. Court, 107 Eng.Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1825)
"[I]t is the duty of a person arresting any one on suspicion of felony to take him before a justice as soon as he reasonably can"); 1 R. Burn, Justice of the Peace 276-277 (1837) ("When a constable arrests a party for treason or felony, he must take him before a magistrate to be examined as soon as he reasonably can") (emphasis omitted).
The practice in the United States was the same. See e.g., 5 Am.Jur.2d §§ 76, 77 (1962); Venable v. Huddy, 77 N.J.L. 351, 72 A. 10, 11 (1909); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Hinsdell, 76 Kan. 74, 76, 90 P. 800, 801 (1907); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Williams, 69 Ga. 251, 262 (1883); Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Americus, 46 Ga. 80, 86-87 (1872); Low v. Evans, 16 Ind. 486, 489 (1861); Tubbs v. Tukey, 57 Mass. 438, 440 (1849) (warrant); Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L.Rev. 201, 254 (1940). Cf. Pepper v. Mayes, 81 Ky. 673 (1884). It was clear, moreover, that the only element bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was not such circumstances as the pressing need to conduct further investigation, but the arresting officer's ability, once the prisoner had been secured, to reach a magistrate who could issue the needed warrant for further detention. 5 Am.Jur.2d §§ 76, 77 (1962); 1 Restatement of Torts § 134 (Comment b) (1934); Keefe v. Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 482, 100 N.E. 558, 559 (1913); Leger v. Warren, 62 Ohio St. 500, 57 N.E. 506, 508 (1900); Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539, 551, 36 A. 327, 329 (1897); Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 405, 35 A. 1089, 1091 (1896); Simmons v. Vandyke, 138 Ind. 380, 384, 37 N.E. 973, 974 (1894) (dictum); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Williams, supra, at 263; Hayes v. Mitchell, 69 Ala. 452, 455 (1881); Kenerson v. Bacon, 41 Vt. 573, 577 (1869); Green v. Kennedy, 48 N.Y. [500 U.S. 62] 653, 654 (1871); Schneider v. McLane, 3 Keyes 568 (NYApp. 1867); Annot., 51 L.R.A. 216 (1901). Cf. Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 544, GO>552 (1860). Any detention beyond the period within which a warrant could have been obtained rendered the officer liable for false imprisonment. See, e.g., Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 265, 26 A. 286, 289 (1893); Wiggins v. Norton, 83 Ga. 148, 152, 9 S.E. 607, 608-609 (1889); Brock v. Stimson, 108 Mass. 520 (1871); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 966 (1964).{GO>1}” County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) [Scalia dissenting]
9) CA. PENAL CODE §740. “Except as otherwise provided by law, all misdemeanors and infractions must be prosecuted by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant. Such complaint may be verified on information and belief.”
OATH: an affermation of truth of a statement, which renders one willifilly asserting untrue statements punishable by perjury [Blacks law Dictionary 4th Edition, page 1220] U.S. v. Klink D.C.Wyo, 3 F Supp [verified]
Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 10. [18 USC App Fed R Crim P Rule 10: Arraignment] Arraignment (a) In General. An arraignment must be conducted in open court and must consist of: (1) ensuring that the defendant has a copy of the indictment or information; [verified]
“Even when the person who makes the constitutionally required "Oath or Affirmation" is a lawyer, the only function that he/she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.” ”The Fourth Amendment requires that arrest warrants be based "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation" -- a requirement that may be satisfied by an indictment returned by a grand jury, but not by the mere filing of criminal charges in an unsworn information signed by the prosecutor. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 (1975); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)
10) PENAL CODE §872. (a) If, however, it appears from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe that the defendant is guilty, the magistrate shall make or indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him or her, to the following effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint mentioned (or any offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature thereof), has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe that the within named A. B. is guilty, I order that he or she be held to answer to the same."
b) Notwithstanding Section 1200 of the Evidence Code, the finding of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer or honorably retired law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
11) PENAL CODE §1382. (a) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, shall order the action to be dismissed in the following cases:(1) When a person has been held to answer for a public offense and an information is not filed against that person within 15 days. PENAL CODE §953. When a defendant is charged by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings is true.
12) PENAL CODE §953. When a defendant is charged by a fictitious or erroneous name, and in any stage of the proceedings his true name is discovered, it must be inserted in the subsequent proceedings, referring to the fact of his being charged by the name mentioned in the accusatory pleading.
13) FRCP> Rule 2. One Form of Action There is one form of action — the civil action.
Rule 17(a) Real Parties in Interest: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.
14) “In every prosecution for crime it is necessary to establish the “corpus delecti”, i.e., the body or elements of the crime.” People v. Lopez, 62 Ca.Rptr. 47, 254 C.A.2d 185.
"In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delecti, or the body of the crime itself-i.e., the fact of injury, loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause." People v. Sapp, 73 P.3d 433, 467 (Cal. 2003) [quoting People v. Alvarez, (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.].
“Elements of “corpus delecti,” injury or loss or harm and a criminal agency which causes such injury, loss or harm, need only be proven by a “reasonable probability,” i.e., by slight or prima facie proof…” People v. Ramirez, 153 Cal.Rptr. 789, 791, 91 C.A. 132.
“Corpus delecti” of crime consists of fact of injury, loss, or harm, and existence of criminal agency as cause.” People v. Daly, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 21, 28, 8 CA4th 47.
“Generally, “corpus delecti” of crime is (1) the fact of the loss or harm, and (2) the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.” People v. Dorsey, 118 Cal.Rptr. 362, 43 CA3d 953.
"There is no requirement of independent evidence 'of every physical act constituting an element of an offense,' so long as there is some slight or prima facie showing of injury, loss, or harm by a criminal agency." In re I.M., 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 375, 381 (2005).
15) “Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-741, n. 16 (1972);{1} and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,'" Whitmore, supra, 495 U.S. at 155 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be fairly… trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not… th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare [504 U.S. 561] Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38, 43. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) [verified]
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